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In  this issue the introductory lecture of the Kungalv confereilce, 
"USA and the Third Morld", by Prof. Karl Erik Svendsen, 
Copenhagen, personal advisor of President Nyerere, is presented 
along with two studies on Theodore Dreiser by Orm Mverland and 
Rolf Lundén. 
We  hope that the new coilcentration o11 the editorial section will 
result in a more varied content for this periodical and above all 
that we will be able to publish more of the research concerning 
America in the field of social sciences. 
USA and the Third World 
By Knud Erik Svendsen 
During the last fcw years I have been involved in a broad range of 
policy problems in one particular developing country. My friends 
in Denmark feel that this has made ine too "specific" - to0 
interested in one s i ~ g l e  tree and not in the wood as a whole. So 
when they hear - if they hear - that I have accepted to speak 
011 "USA and the Third World" theg propably enjoy some badly 
motivated feelings, followed by sudden worries about what I an1 
going to do to this important topic. This may, in fact, be my main 
motive in presenting my special version of the English language to 
this association. 
More important is, of course, that we all are forced to be concerned 
about this major contemporary problem whether we live in USA or 
another industrialized country or in a low profit developing country 
in Africa or in more exposed parts of the two other continents of 
the Third World. What I propose to do is to  use the limitations in 
my background - I am not an expert on global politics, American 
Society, or on ecology - to raise a nuinber of questions (i.e., to 
select what I believe to be the more important aspects of the problem 
and to suggest some answers in order to ges inputs from the factors 
of production which you represent). Knowing soinething about a 
few trees, I shall try to speculate about the forest. 
As a beginning it  mighi; be useful to split the topic into compo- 
nents: the Third World, the USA, their CO-presence o11 this sinall 
globe and the flow of time or the dynamics of these components and 
the structure they Eorin. 
First of all, I a111 not sure that i t  inakes too much sense to speak 
of a Third World, or the developing countries as a liomogenous 
group of states. The understandable preference of international 
organisations to generalize often leads to serious loss i11 individuality 
of the many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin Amcrica. There is 
a common denominator of a low level of niaterial living, short 
average length of life and so on, a commonness of poverty, but there 
are also eiiormous differences. Let mc just mcntion the six most 
populous of thc countries according to a rather outtiated usage 
tliic Peoplc's Republic of China belongs to the second world -- they 
ase: India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigcria ancl Mcxico. Of 
course thcrc ase c0111111011 features, also in thcir relations witli USA, 
but in their prcsent situation and in their recent history thcre arc 
also great differences. This diversity is perhaps most distinct in the 
sphere of politics. And I sometiines wonder whether the tendency 
of large bureaucracies to globalize by spealiing about the devcloping 
couiltry does not lead to a neglcct of political factors. If I throw 
in a few other names of developing countries you inay understand 
what I mean: the Pliilippiries, Cuba, the Dominicail Republic, Congo, 
Algeria and Vietnam. 
We  have the same problem of diversity when we look at the 
second component: the USA. Maybc tlie Aniericaiis and the rest 
of us had a reasonably clcar picture of what IJSA inemt ten ycars 
ago - I said maybe - today vcry little of the Grcat Arnericaii 
Celebration is left. Thcrc is a process of decelebration raising 
fundamental questions about state, society and individual far outside 
the New Left, which Ly tlie way did not exist a decade ago. 111 
this diversity we must look for some pattern or maybe several 
patterns. 
Tben there ase the effects of thc prescncc of an inhalitant lilie 
the USA in what lias been called spaceship carth. The USA is very 
big in terms of production - it produccs roughly half of thc output 
of the Western countries - but this is only a part of the problem. 
IJSA is a changing structurc, propelled along by s t r o q  material and 
tcchnological forces, it is also a conglomerate of many strong short 
alid loil:; run interest-s, it is a state witli rulcrs who thiilli in terms 
of sole, leadership and commitments in the World. FIow does this 
affect the countrics in Africa, Asia and Latin America and liow 
important are these couiitrics os some of them to rhe USA? 
All these grand questions we have to combinc witli a sense of 
time. A rewriting of history is taliing place to  such an extent that 
I understand that one speaks of a revisionist school in the USA. 
A number of international organisations have during the last two 
years tried to assess the performance of the developing countries in 
the sixties and to think ahead in development decades. First of 
January this year began the Second Development Decade or as i t  
with an unfortunate abbreviation is called: the DD2. 
The rethorics of the declaration on the second decade show that 
there has been a shift in the understanding of the development 
problem in the last ten years. The sixtics began with growth as the 
dominant concern, even expïessed in a growth target for the devel- 
oping countries. At  that time there was also a fashionable theory 
of stages - presented by an American historian later to become 
advisor to a president -- arguing for a sequence for all countries 
leading to the stage of happy mass consumption, i.e. the USA of 
the fifties. This approach will have little chance t o  gain similar 
publicity today aftes a decade of learning which has brought if not 
ready answers to major problems then a t  kast greater modesty. 
The goals of development policies ase now defined much more 
broadly and while many a t  that time were ready to accept growing 
economic and social inequality as a necessary compariion of growth, 
then most nowadays are ready to agree that this may create serious 
internal probletns. This concern may be just a concession to reality, 
i.e. t o  experiences of social turmoil as a result of a one-sided g o w t h  
process. The Harvard people were taught this lesson in Pakistan. I t  
may Le a dislike of too much inequality as when the U N  resolution 
on the second decade with a strange choice of words says: "If 
undue privileges, extremes of wealth and social injustices persist, 
then development iails in its essential purpose." One may ask: 
What are due privileges? O r  it  may be a more straightforward 
advocacy of social revolution. I n  any case few will today accept 
and state that a sustained increase in material production in itself 
will solve the problem of the poor countries. 
There is also much greater understanding of the difficulty of devel- 
oping the developing countries. Many liberal advocates of increased 
foreign assistance - e.g. Lester Pearson's Commission on Inter- 
national Development - have counteracted a widespread disil- 
lusionment around the results of assistance, to be found in particular 
in USA, by describing the performance of the sixties in excessivly 
optimistic terms. They could have limited thernselves to  the statement 
that inany of the expectatioiis to ~ h e  ffect of a very small trailsfer 
of resources were completely wild. But apparently public optimism 
is understood to be better than public realism as an appeal for 
further aid. 
There was a lot of instability in the Third World in the sixties, 
Lut very few cases of o~itright chaos. And the overall growth target 
of an annua1 increase in total production of 5 per cent was reached 
for the group of countries as a whole but not for the inajority of its 
populationc. 
Still the major lesson has been the difficulty of the task and a 
growing acceptance of the multi-dimensional nature of the process. 
I am afraid, however, that very few have followed this line of 
thinking through to its logical concl~ision. Too inany spealr as if 
closing the gap between the poor and the rich countries is a practical 
proposition. This is really to hope for s o m  kind of miracle or to 
resist to recognize the size of the gap or the extreme distortion of 
the living conditions on the globe produced in the past two-three 
centuries. 
If the present rates of the growth continue Latin America will 
at  the end of the century have reached the present average income of 
the developed countries and Africa and Asia will have obtained 
the present Latin America level. In  the meantime, the centers of 
technological innovation i.e. the developed countries, will grow 
even more and the gap in absolute and relative terms will have 
increased. 
One can discuss the details of the assumptions but I believe that 
the conclusion will stand that it makes no sense to expect the devel- 
oping countries to copy the present forms of material living in the 
industrialized countries. Xhere are good reasoils to discuss whether 
such an imitation is desirable. Everything seems to show that it is 
not possible. 
A reflection on the roots of underdevelopment may ~ e r h a ~ s  
remove a little of the blind faith in developmentalism. There is 
growing acceptance of the Eact that some countries are poor because 
some other countries are rich, or that world economic system limits 
development and underdevelopment. The distortion has gone so far 
that there is little chance of removing it. And up til1 now and 
probably through the 70's the spread effect of the rich countries 
of v e s t  will be negative if the present international economic 
order is not radically changed. I shall expand this point a little later. 
~ ~ v ~ l o p i n g  countries must, therefore, look for other ways of 
increasing human happiness. A development policy must aim at 
other than only material things. President Nyerere has said "Other 
nations aim at the moon, we must aim at the village." One could 
add that the aim must be - from the beginning - the quality of 
life. And this aim must take the form of viable social units a t  low 
levels of income. This calls for a much wider approach to techriology 
than we are used to. 
~t also raises the issue of equality and inequality. Viable social 
of the nature just discussed are probably not possible with large 
degrees of inequality, so equality for that reason becomes a devel- 
opment objective. But is this not utopian in the sense that most of 
what we have seen in the Third World produces inequality? 
A report 011 Poverty in India prepared by the Indian School of 
political Economy, under a contract from the Ford Foundation was 
published in January this year. I t  concluded that during the past 
d e d e  per capita consumer expenditure increased by less than half 
a per cent per year. Moreover the small gains have not been 
equitably distributed among all sections of the population. The 
study believes that a deliberate policy to ensure an equitable distri- 
bution o1 the gains of development is possible, without accepting 
communism as a classical solution to the problem of poverty. But 
the belief rests on the hope - to quote - that the rich, the vested 
interests and the policy makers who represent them will see the 
point. If no t .  . . 
This is not only India's problem. Latin American countries have 
had this conflict of interests much longer. President Nixon gave it 
a special twist in his report on U.S.-Foreign Policy for the 1970's, 
February this year where it  is stated "Efforts to reconcile the often 
conflicting demands of social reform and economic growth and to 
meet the need for popular support, have spawned statist, sometimes 
radical, approaches." T o  this, more and more Latin Americans will 
say that i t  is not possible to get economic growth wilhout social 
reform and mass participation. There may be a choice in the short 
run, but not in the long run. 
It is a central question what American Policy makers think about 
this ferment in the Third World. And Latin America provides many 
examples of their temporary solutions to this problem. Intervention, 
support of reformists d la Frei, freezing of Quadros and Goulart 
followed by assistance to the military regime in Brazil. If there is 
any consistency in the American approach to this changing situation 
then it  is a reduction in the use of economic assistance and a chaiige 
from traditional military assistance to technical assistance in couii- 
teriiisurgency efforts. This was called by the then Secretary of 
Defence Robert S. McNamara in his report to Congress in February, 
1968 to  reorient "the military policy to  bring it  into line with the 
nature and scope of the real threat." 
Whether olie believcs that the developing countries are ripe for 
revolution or not i t  is obvious that many of these countries because 
of their internal politico-economic structure and the tensions bet- 
ween expectations and possibilities each in its own way will 
experience revolutionary situations where. one or another form of 
politics may take conimand. 
Instead of aslsing straight-away about USA's interests in these 
niatters we should rather ask the question how the American devel- 
opment situation in the past and present influences tlie American 
ability t o  perceive the true nature of the situation in the three 
continents. USA is more than ane of the super-powers, i t  also 
represents a specific social systeni in a specific geographical and 
resource setting. 
As such the American development liistory is probably the most 
special case of all. An extremely advantageous resource position both 
in terms of land, capital and nien has bcen combined with a similarly 
advantageous security position far away from the European theater. 
The second war restored and pushed the econoniy ahead after a 
severe crisis and the result has become the highest statistical level 
of living. With the knowledge we now have of other development 
cases it is or ought to Le very obvious that this American statistical 
success is very exceptional, that USA cannot be imitatrd. 
And the sixties beginning with top-level concern about the mili- 
tary-industrial complex have produced a large amount of new 
thinking on the trends of American social and economic development. 
This heartsearcliiiig has penetrated official rethorics in the second 
half of the sixties setting iiew and diffcrent goals for the future. 
In  a statement on tfie economic policy issues for tlie 1970's the. 
O.E.C.D. last year called for a bettcr direction of the growth 
process so that the extra wealth is used to nieet the needs and wants 
of society and tlie damaging side cffects of growtli are prevented. 
And the major policy goals are said to Le the alleviation of poverty, 
tlie provision of acceptable liousing standards, the elimination of 
liazards to health, tlie improvement of environmeiit. Some analysts 
are discovering that USA is in fact three forms of life in one country: 
a pre-industrial, an industrial and a post-industrial civilization. 
The American self-image is clearly being eroded. Rut is it possible 
to discover a "law of motion" of Modern Americaii society, to 
trace leadiiig factors and resulting trends in USA? Foreign policy, 
including US policy towards the Third World, may respond with 
some time lag to internal changes in the USA, but i t  still seems to 
be sensible to accept somc form of link (betwcen doinestic and external 
affairs. Many statesmen in the Third World are askiiig the question: 
what will happen to the USA in the seventies, inaybe without the 
condescending tone which dominates miich American comment on 
"instability" in Blacli Africa. 
The high degree of political unrest in USA in tlie last few years 
niakcs i t  very difficult to form an opinion on what will happen. 
The outcoine will depend upon various objective factors, but also 
on the subjective reactions to the situation. And soine of the problems 
which American ~o l i t i c s  face these years are new to the system 
- even if some of them have been linown for long in Europe, to 
use the condescending tone of a Scandinavian - so that tlie USA 
1 in its own terms is on a social or socialpsycliological frontier which 
I inalses prediction very difficult. 
It may still be useful to  consider some of the major components 
in the sitiuation. To  ine as a political economist they seem to be: 
1 an economic system based on large privately controlled corporations, 
l 
a growing participation of general governnient in economic life and 
1 a military sector larger and more active than ever before in American 
history. A t  the same time there is a high rate of technological 
development, stimulated if not dependent on military and space 
I programnies. And a scene of groups or social stratification or class 
l formation with new actors like the students, the black Americans, 
i and those who resist the war in Vietnam. 
Short of an international monetary disaster very few would spend 
time on discussing the possibility of a major economic setback, 
provided that USA can learn to live with inflation. But there are 
still serious economic problems such as unemployment, 'hitting the 
young and among them especially the black, and the major problem 
of performing in terms of public consumption. Capacity to produce 
commodities will keep on growing, but the problem of using this 
capacity is worrying many more than Marxists like Baran and 
Sweezy. I n  fact, the most interesting about their important book 
"Monopoly Capital" is the reaction of other Marxists to  their theses 
that the present system can only dispose of the rising surplus through 
the military and that it can only be changed through a revolution 
coming from the villages of the world, i.e. the developing countries. 
Other Marxists expressed a belief in the ability of the American 
system to adapt to the needs for social reform also because they 
thought that Baran and Sweezy were wrong in discarding the 
American working class as being bribed with increasing private con- 
sumption. Some of the problems faced by USA have been solved 
by other countries with capitalist systems of production through 
social reforms, so why could this not happen in USA - these 
other Marxists seem to ask. 
On  the domestic scene the American government as representing 
a form of general interests - as opposed to the interests of indi- 
vidual giant corporations - are squarely faced with the need to 
handle urgent social problems. The effects of the war in Vietnam on 
American society have emphasized this, even if they are still 
working their way into the American mind. The rich and powerful 
American system has not found a feasible method to win a war in 
a smal1 developing country, the high material and human costs (to 
USA) are being understood. Not  only the conscience of inany 
Americans, but also their self-confidence has been affected. 
Another American analyst of a different kind, namely Z. Brze- 
zinski wrote in his book "Between Two Ages" that to-day in the 
Third World a subjective revolution is preceding change in the 
objective environment and creating a state of unrest, uneasiness, 
anger, anguish, and outrage. His analysis of USA might have been 
less dominated by the marvels of technology, if he had known that 
many in the Third World think that USA is in the same position. 
Perhaps the most difficult factor to predict is the behaviour of 
ehe niilitary sector. Many of us are used to be worried about the 
arrny leaderships in developing countries, because of their strength 
in weak political systems, The relative strength of the military 
complex has grown steadily in USA in recent years. O n  the other 
hand the pay-off of the military expenditures has been doubtful 
and army court cases of recent months have shown how labile the 
attitudes towards the inilitary are, following an ~~ncuccessful war. 
All this is part of the background for our thinking on the relation- 
ship between USA and the Third World. We have to ask how the 
interests of the expanding American corporations affect the Third 
World, what the general economic interests of USA vis A vis the 
developing countries are, how the American military look on the 
Third World, how the leaders perceive US interests as a super- 
power and all of this in a situation where the American scene is in a 
state of flux. 
The Third World is as a sphere of investment for American corpo- 
rations. This presence of foreign controlled assets create a number 
of problems. The Latin American countries have been the first to 
witness that i t  is far from true that what is good for the American 
corporations is good for the World. Celso Furtado who was a leading 
economist in Brazil before the militarg dictatorship, said in a study 
published last year that the large firms with their advanced tech- 
nology and high degree of capital intensity have the same effects 
on an underdeveloped economy - especially when they are sup- 
ported by many privileges - as certain large exotic trees brought 
into new areas: they drain off all the water and they dry out the 
land and thereby create an ecological unbalance that permits the 
einergence of diseases and plagues. According to Furtado the 
hegemony which the United States exercises in Latin America 
constitutes a serious obstacle to the development of the majority of 
the countries in the region since it reinforces the anachronistic power 
structures. The foreign-aid strategy of the US Governrnent which 
creaces privileges for large corporations and which exercises preven- 
tive control of "subversion", contributes to the preservation of 
the most retrograde means of social organisation. And it  tends to 
negate the effectiveness of the national states as decision-making 
centers and as instruments for the mobilizatiori of societies to 
undertake the tasks of developinent. 
The economic presence of USA in other countries may not be 
as strong as in Latin America, but the efforts to export the American 
corporate system are the same. Why are so many governments so 
cooperative in this matter? A few of thein because they ieel confident 
that they can control the foreign corporations, others because they 
only see the immediate effects of foreign investments, and others 
again because the leading strata in the countries benefit from such a 
policy a t  the expense of the overall development of the economies 
of their countries. 
On  the whole the US Governinents have supported this general 
emphasis on private invcstments and Presidcnt Nixoa has recently 
stressed it  in his foreign aid statemems. I t  is a policy which creates 
decision-making problems for the USA in a numbcr of countries, 
partly because the strategy does not seem to be effective in proino- 
ting internal, if only lopsided development in the countries, partly 
because it is met with national resistance in an increasing iiumber of 
countries. The Third World a t  this moment watches the US behaviour 
towards countries like Chile and Peru, ten years after the attempted 
invasion of Cuba. 
The Third World is important to the 1J.S. economy not only as 
a sphere of investment and trade for American corporations, but 
also as an important supplier of raw materials. For quite a number 
of important materials the USA - contrary to what inany think - 
depends on materials from a few developing countries. This has 
been amply demonstrated by Harry Magdoff in his study "The Age 
of Imperialism". What  this fact of nature means to the Ainerican 
economy is another matter. I t  is clear that uncontrolled American 
corporations will attempt to control the sources of supply, but it 
is not certain that they can Le checked only by a complete change in 
the American system. A more concerted effort irom governments in 
developing countries may lead to higher prices on these particular 
materials. Interests in the USA will, of course, try t o  use the US 
government against such efforts. I t  should be added that far froin all 
- and few of the most populous -- countries in the Third World are 
in this position of suppliers of important raw materials. 
The USA, however, does not perceive its role just in terms of 
specific econoinic interests in particular countries. There are to0 
many signs that the American leadership have a much broader 
notion of its role or commitment based not only on its position as a 
superpower vis A vis two other superpowers, but also on its ideas 
on how the countries except those already "lost to communism" 
ought to manage their affairs. The Third World is not alone with 
the USA on this globe but i t  is still exposed to the effects of the US 
perception of its leadership roles. The Nixon doctrine has not 
changed this - - a t  least as I have been able to  study it  from Dar es 
Salaam. In the al re ad^ mentioned February report to Congress 
President Nixoii says that the greater share in the definition of policy 
as well as in bearing the costs of programs requiers to qoute "a 
new, more subtle form of leadershipY' and "a more efiicient and a 
less conspicuous approach". And he warns against "nascent isola- 
tiollisin in reaction to overextension". 
The major problem of US foreigti policy as seen from the Third 
World is, therefore, not only its active efforts "to contain commu- 
nism" as the consequence of the activities of the other superpowers. 
I t  is also and rather the continued fear of American leaders of real 
social changes leading to patterns of development which if not 
communlst at  least question many of the values of the American 
establishmeiit. 
I n  Africa, which I know best, more and more politically interested 
people are becoming interested in Latin Anierican matters, less and 
less because of Cuba and its - mixed - experience, but more be- 
cause of the changes in other countries. The lesson that the 1960's 
taught the U.S. Government in Latin America - to  speak with the 
historian Eric Hobsbawn - (as they did more dramatically in 
Vietnam) is that tliere are severe limits to the power of even the 
biggest, richest and most niegatoned imperial ruleï. 
Personally, I hope that such a better sense of proportion with 
regard to the official USA will pay the way to a better understanding 
in the Third World of unofficial USA and its efforts to develop 
values of a kind which can bring hope and friendship similar to 
efforts of soine developing countries whether they are ranked in the 
Second or the Third World. 
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